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EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST: STRAINS ON KEY ELEMENTS OF AMERICA'S VITAL INTERESTS

REPORT

OF

SENATOR WILLIAM S. COHEN

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

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CONTENTS

	Page
Letter of Transmittal	v
Introduction	1
Background	1
Conclusions	2
Conclusions	2
The Wehrkunde Conference	4
Differing perceptions of the threat	4
Perspectives on détente	5
Defense contributions of West Germany and the United States	7
Egypt	9
Camp David Accords	9
President Mubarak	10
The Sudan	10
The Iran-Iraq war	11
United States use of Egyptian facilities	12
Israel	13
Arms transfers to Jordan	13
United States-Israeli memorandum of understanding regarding strategic cooperation	14
Israeli perceptions of the peace process	15
Israeli's "red lines" of defense	16
Bahrain	17
United States-Bahraini relations	17
The Iran-Iraq war	18
Oman	19
United States-Oman defense relationship	19
Saudi support for Oman	20
The Sudan	20
The Iran-Iraq war	20
The Middle East peace process	22
Summary	22
Appendixes—Remarks before the 19th Wehrkunde Conference, Munich, Federal Republic of Germany, February 13, 1982:	
I. Hans Apel, Minister of Defense, FRG	23
II. Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, U.S.A	33
III. William S. Cohen, U.S. Senator, Chairman, Sea Power and Force Projection Subcommittee	38

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., April 19, 1982.

Hon. JOHN TOWER,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Defense of Europe and of United States and Western European interests in Southwest Asia is one of the primary missions of the Department of Defense and is of great importance to the Sea Power and Force Projection Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services. As part of my responsibilities as chairman of that subcommittee, I undertook a trip to Europe and the Middle East during February 11–20, 1982, to examine the issues that currently surround these key elements of our Nation's vital interests. The trip started with my participation in the Wehrkunde Conference held in Munich, West Germany and was followed by visits to Egypt, Israel, Bahrain, Oman and ships of the U.S. Navy operating in the Indian Ocean. A report outlining the major themes of the trip is attached.

The Wehrkunde Conference was held from February 12–14, 1982. It is an annual meeting of policymakers and experts from all 15 member nations of the NATO alliance and is designed to review alliance relations. Thirty-three senior Americans participated in the conference, including six U.S. Senators: Senator Charles Percy, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Robert Kasten, Senator John Glenn, and Senator Christopher Dodd you, and me. Much of the discussion focused on the sense of drift within the alliance, with sharp differences of opinion as to whether the current level of disagreement is fundamentally threatening to the alliance.

The focus of my visit to Egypt was to review the status of the burgeoning defense relationship between the United States and Egypt. I received a briefing by Ambassador Alfred Atherton and his country team on U.S.-Egyptian relations, and met with President Muhammed Hosni Mubarak, Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali, Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Muhammed Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala, and Mr. Kamal Henry Badir, Chairman, National Security Committee, People's Assembly.

In Israel I was joined by Senator John Glenn. We received a briefing by Ambassador Samuel Lewis and key embassy officials on U.S.-Israeli relations. We had a long meeting with Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon in which we discussed a range of issues which affect our two countries. We also held a separate meeting with Mr. Shimon Peres, leader of the opposition Labor Party.

During my visit to Bahrain, I had an opportunity to meet with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa, and the Defense Force Chief of Staff, Brigadier Shaikh Khalifa bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa, to review security issues of mutual concern. In addition, I met with the Minister of Development and Industries, Yusuf Shirawi and the Minister of Information, Tarig Al-Muayyed, and I had discussions with Ambassador Peter Sutherland and the Commander, U.S. Middle East Force, Rear Admiral Charles Gurney.

In Oman, I met with the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yusuf Al-Alawi, who subsequently was promoted to the position of Minister of State; the Chief of the Defense Staff, Sultan's Armed Forces, General Timothy Creasy; and Commander, Sultan of Oman's Navy, Commodore John Gunning. Ambassador John Countryman and his country team provided excellent insights into the status of U.S.-Oman relations.

I also visited the USS *John F. Kennedy* (CV–67) and the USS *Barney* (DDG–6) operating in the Indian Ocean, and held discussions with Rear Admiral Robert Fuller, Commander, Carrier Group Four, his staff, and the officers and crews of both ships.

Finally, I would like to thank Senator Glenn for his incisive contributions during my stay in Israel, and Bob Andrews and Carl Ford who accompanied him. I would like to thank the staff members who accompanied me on the trip and assisted in preparing this report: Mr. Wayne Arny and Mr. Drew Harker of the Armed Services Committee staff, and Mr. Jeffrey Record, who is a consultant on my staff. I would also like to express my appreciation to my military escort, Maj. Dan Kennedy, USAF, who provided valuable assistance throughout the trip and efficiently managed a demanding and trying schedule that involved more than 15,000 miles of travel and over 20 official meetings in 9 days.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM S. COHEN.

EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST: STRAINS ON KEY ELEMENTS OF AMERICA'S VITAL INTERESTS

INTRODUCTION

Europe and the Middle East stand today, as they have for decades, as two of the most important areas of the modern world for the United States. America's relationship with Europe predates our existence as an independent nation and led the United States into two world wars in this century and into the rebuilding of Europe after the last war.

On the other hand, the United States interest in the Middle East developed slowly and relatively recently. It was greatly enhanced after World War II, when access to oil became a political-military concern, and most recently when the Soviet threat to Western interests in the area became apparent.

The outcome of close relations with Europe was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), formed after, and as a result of, World War II. Not only does the United States have cultural and historic ties to Europe, but it is committed by NATO ties to defend Western Europe against outside aggression.

The outcome of increasingly closer U.S. relations with the Middle East was not stated as formally as it was with Europe. Until recently, the United States minimized its direct security role in the region. Instead, the United States relied at different times on British presence, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and Iran to play major roles in maintaining the region's security. During the Kennedy administration, however, ties to Israel strengthened, and since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the United States has been directly involved in the attempts to bring peace to the region and to find a satisfactory solution to the Arab-Israeli crisis.

More recently, increased U.S. dependence on the Middle East and the lack of other stabilizing influences led to former President Carter's pledge to defend the Persian Gulf region from outside aggression with force, if necessary, and to President Reagan's reaffirmation of that policy. Moreover, while American dependence on the Middle East has increased, and appears as if it will remain extensive in both economic and political terms for the foreseeable future, the dependence of our Western European allies on the region is even greater. This adds an extra and complicating dimension to an already complex relationship.

BACKGROUND

As is normal, unfortunately, in times of relative peace, certain strains have developed within U.S. relations with both Europe and the Middle East—strains which seem to have become magnified in the past two years. The increasing awareness on the part of the United States that we and our allies are falling behind the Soviet Union and

its allies militarily has caused the Reagan administration to seek to rebuild American military forces while simultaneously preparing for arms limitation negotiations. At the same time, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet proxy threats to areas around the globe have caused the United States to increase deployments to the Indian Ocean and improve the Rapid Deployment Force to make it more useful in the defense of American interests in those regions.

The responses from some West European allies to these Soviet incursions, however, have not been what the United States expected. Instead of solidly backing American attempts to punish aggressive Soviet behavior, they have been unwilling to disengage from increased contacts and enhanced economic relationships with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, or to increase in real terms their defense expenditures, their share of the defense of the central front of Europe, or their share of the defense of the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean area.

In the Middle East, on the other hand, U.S. strategy rests on the development of a strategic consensus among U.S. friends who are concerned about the Soviet and regional threat to the peace and stability of the area. Underlying this approach is the assumption that two of the goals of U.S. policy in the region—a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute and containment of the Soviet Union—are mutually reinforcing. The argument is that if America's friends are more secure from external threats, they will be more willing to take risks for peace, and if there is progress in the peace process, security cooperation will be facilitated. Unfortunately, the nations of the Middle East have very little consensus with each other. Arab states perceive the U.S. arms supply relationship with Israel as contributing to an Israeli military establishment which threatens Arab interests, and Israel fears that the arming of Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, by the United States primarily threatens Israel.

At the same time that the United States has experienced these specific problems, the international diffusion of power has served to fundamentally affect other aspects of the United States relations with its NATO allies and its Middle Eastern friends. The economic reconstruction of Western Europe served to enhance the international economic power of Europe, while the rise of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Exporting Countries (OPEC) had the same effect on a number of Arab countries in the Middle East. The increasing self-confidence which this wealth and economic power brought, coupled with the involvement of the United States in Vietnam, the August 1971 devaluation of the dollar by President Nixon, and the growth of Soviet military power relative to the United States, made it increasingly difficult for the United States to maintain its influence with the Western alliance or with the nations of the Middle East.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Today the North Atlantic Alliance is in a state of crisis, although there is great disagreement over the long-run implications of this situation.

2. The United States and its NATO allies share different perceptions about the precise nature of the Soviet threat, and therefore about the desired response.

3. The United States and Europe have developed two different sets of relations with the Soviet Union, and this has contributed to the crisis in the alliance.

4. Important NATO allies of the United States, most particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, expect the United States to unilaterally defend vital Western interests outside the NATO alliance area without drawing down on U.S. forces in Europe.

5. The United States, however, is in no position to condemn West Europeans for their reluctance to curb growing economic entanglements with the East until the United States itself is ready to fully disengage from economic ties with both the Soviets and their allies.

6. President Mubarak of Egypt gives the impression that he, unlike his predecessor, intends to seek a broader base for his policies and to win over his critics through consultation, rather than confrontation.

7. Of all the facilities in Egypt, Ras Banas on the Red Sea coast was the only one that the Egyptians agreed was really feasible to improve for possible American use during a regional crisis. It was clearly stated, however, that such a facility would always be subject to Egyption sovereignty and control.

8. Egypt will seek some reconciliation with the Arab world, at the likely expense of maintaining good relations with Israel. Thus, the future of the Camp David Accords is seriously in doubt.

9. The provision of sophisticated arms to Jordan and the general redirection of U.S. policy away from Israel to the Arab world are ill-advised and will work against long-term U.S. interests in the region.

10. Serious consideration should be given by the United States to bringing back into effect the memorandum of understanding on strategic cooperation between the United States and Israel, which was suspended by the United States after the "de facto" Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights.

11. The deteriorating security situation in the Sudan is of increasing importance to regional leaders, and should receive priority attention from the United States.

12. Iran is beginning to gain momentum in its war with Iraq, and an Iranian victory could have serious implications for U.S. interests.

13. Without a resolution to the Arab-Israeli crisis, the friendly Arab nations of the Middle East are restrained from seeking closer ties with the United States.

14. Because of the relations of the United States with Israel and with the Arab nations, and because of the reputation of the United States as "the most powerful nation in the world," America is thrust by its position and by Arab tradition into the role of mediator of the Arab-Israeli crisis.

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THE WEHRKUNDE CONFERENCE

The Wehrkunde Conference was held in Munich, West Germany, from February 12–14, 1982, and took place against a backdrop of increasing concern that the North Atlantic Alliance is in disarray. Much of the discussion focused on the sense of drift within the alliance. Some argued that disagreement among democratic allies is natural and does not fundamentally threaten the alliance, while others argued that the splits in the alliance are serious and need immediate attention. Based on my discussions at Wehrkunde, I have reached the conclusion that the differences which divide the alliance are deep and fundamental and that a serious reassessment of those differences is in order to determine how NATO's military power and economic strength can be better structured to enhance the alliance's ability to defend Western security interests.

DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT

The United States and its European partners have different perceptions about the precise nature of the Soviet threat and, therefore, about the desired response. In the past, the bedrock of the alliance was assumed to be a consensus on the nature of the Soviet threat. That assumption, however, has been called into question.

In light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States concluded that a new period of East-West relations had been reached: for the first time since World War II the Soviet Union had used massive military power outside the Warsaw Pact region. The response of the United States to the invasion was two-fold: it condemned the invasion as illegal and instituted a number of short-term punitive measures; and more significantly it stressed the strategic consequences for the West of overt Soviet military aggression. Hence, Washington emphasized the Soviet military menace and the threat of direct Soviet intervention and indicated that it felt that the West should be prepared to respond to this challenge militarily, if necessary.

On the other hand, West Europeans saw the Soviet build-up as dangerous primarily because it made non-military destabilization safer and more practical for the Soviet Union. They felt that the Soviet emphasis would then be on opportunities for indirect aggression in the Third World, rather than on direct aggression against Europe. Consequently, the Europeans preferred a more subtle response to Soviet aggression rather than the more active response they felt the United States preferred. They still, however, wanted to link their response to a restoration of the global military balance, but they did not agree with increased U.S. dependence on forward deployment of military forces. The allies remained much more skeptical about whether military intervention guaranteed anything in the Third World, and they stressed the strength of political, economic, cultural, and linguistic linkages as policy tools.

The West German Minister of National Defense, Dr. Hans Apel, alluded to the need for a political, rather than military, strategy when he spoke at Wehrkunde:

> The alliance needs a political concept to guide it with respect to the management of "external" crises and threats. What is crucially important in this context is that we make the right of all states to self-determination the maxim of our actions. If they prefer to be non-aligned, we must accept and respect their decision. They are not a glacis of our foreign policy. They are equals having the right to determine their own course. *Development aid* and *diplomacy* are the decisive means of political action available to us in the Third World.
>
> Avoiding and controlling conflicts in the Third World, and averting dangers that threaten to disrupt the flow of raw materials to the Western industrial nations is thus *largely a political problem, at least not only a military one.* (Emphasis added.)[1]

PERSPECTIVES ON DÉTENTE

Partly as a result of the differing perceptions of the threat, the North Atlantic Alliance has witnessed two separate policies of détente with Moscow take form within its ranks, and today this is contributing to the crisis in NATO. The West European-Soviet détente evolved first. Basing their policy on first recognizing the territorial status quo that existed after World War II, the West Europeans bargained on a dynamic transformation occurring in the East that would ease East-West tensions and result in allowing the nations of the West to decrease their defense efforts. On the other side of the Atlantic, détente corresponded to a theory of networks, linkages, rewards and penalties that would constrain Soviet behavior and eventually permit arms limitations and force reductions.

As East-West relations evolved over the last 10 years, it is evident that Western Europe and America did in fact develop different relations with the Soviet Union. Whether this occurred as a result of the differing theories or in spite of them is unclear. What is clear is that Western Europe gained far more in tangible benefits than did the United States from that period of détente. In 1980, for example, West Germany's exports to the Soviet Union totaled $4.373 billion, and it was the leading trade partner outside of the Soviet Union for most of the East European members of the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, most of the major industrial projects financed by sources outside of the Warsaw Pact were financed by West European firms. By virtue of geographic location, philosophy, and perceived ethnic necessity, the Federal Republic of Germany had achieved a special place in the evolution of détente; millions of East and West Germans passed through Berlin to visit friends and relatives on the other side, and emigration of ethnic Germans from the East increased dramatically.

Because of these factors, the Europeans are more inclined to see détente as divisible; that is, they are more easily able to separate, and protect, the gains of détente in Europe from the distractions caused by Soviet misbehavior in Afghanistan or Poland. Hence, they have generally opposed any direct sanctions against the Soviet Union for fear that these sanctions would jeopardize all of the benefits of the 10-year period of détente—a period in which Western Europe has

[1] See Appendix I for the full text of Dr. Apel's remarks.

improved its political relations and assumed a dominating trade position with Eastern Europe.

The United States, on the other hand, tends to treat détente as indivisible. Soviet actions outside Europe cannot be separated from relations inside Europe. Therefore, the Western response to Soviet moves in Afghanistan included responses that affected Soviet interests within the European framework.

This clash of perspectives was well documented at Wehrkunde. Although West Germany's Defense Minister Apel spoke of the "common voice and resolute solidarity of the alliance" regarding the situation in Poland, and the necessity for the Soviet Union not "to make the mistake of underestimating the foreign policy of the alliance countries, notably that of the United States," he clearly made his case for the continued maintenance of détente as "an integral part of a sweeping Western strategy." Beyond the need for firmness in the West's dealings with the East, he stated that:

> . . . we must not forget that it would be an unwise act on the part of the West if it decided to do without détente, for it will only be possible in a political environment characterized by détente for the side scenes of cold war to be removed, scenes which might prevent the peoples in East and West from seeing the real differences between the Communist and the Western ways of life. An environment susceptible to crises will invariably benefit the more brutal and reckless side. Détente is definitely not tantamount to giving oneself up . . .

Caspar W. Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense for the United States, presented the American view of détente. He began by turning the European concept of détente on its head. Secretary Weinberger argued that the notion of détente as enmeshing the Soviets in a web of interrelationships, and thus constraining their behavior, was wrong. Rather, he claimed that détente has financed the buildup of the Soviet military machine:

> This economic expression of the theory of détente has turned out to be expensive and, I think it's fair to say, dangerously wrong. "Business as usual" with the Soviets, and expansion of East-West trade simply meant, on the Soviet side, more money for the Soviets to spend on their military. And that is what they did with their trading profits. Trade, with a country that ignores the already wretched quality of life for its own citizens, and then turns its trading gains into a one-nation arms race, encourages aggression rather than helping to bring peace. The massive infusion of Western capital and know-how of the last decade did not produce moderation or restraint. Instead, it helped to sustain the continuing buildup of Soviets arms as money and technology was turned to the principal purpose to which the Soviet economy is attuned: the production of more and better weapons.[2]

Secretary Weinberger urged that Poland should be held in default of its debts and that this "business as usual" attitude with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact must be curbed.

In my view, however, the United States is in no position to condemn the Europeans for their reluctance to curb growing economic entanglements with the East. The United States has sent contradictory signals in this regard as is evidenced by the failure of the United States to claim default on Poland's loans, to revoke a license for Caterpillar to send pipe-laying equipment to the Soviet Union or to halt grain shipments to the Soviet Union.[3]

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[2] See Appendix II for a full text of Secretary Weinberger's remarks.

[3] Appendix III includes the full text of remarks by Senator Cohen before the Wehrkunde Conference.

DEFENSE CONTRIBUTIONS OF WEST GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

During his remarks, Prime Minister Apel did speak in positive terms of the contribution that West Germany makes to the common defense.

> The arena where Germany makes its main contribution is Europe. Here the Federal Republic provides its share in accordance with the priorities agreed upon in the alliance: We have, for example, made considerable progress in implementing the German-U.S. programme to support external reinforcements from overseas. We have fulfilled a major part of the Long-Term Defence Programme. We have lifted the operational boundaries for the German Navy in the North Sea. And we have for years been providing financial aid to the tune of thousands of millions of marks in an effort to stabilize NATO's southern flank.

In contrast to this positive picture of Bonn's contributions to the common defense, however, one need only look at the German defense budget of $19.05 billion for fiscal year 1982, which represents a gross spending increase of about 3.6 percent from 1981. With inflation in Germany running at approximately 4.5 percent, this means that defense spending was cut in real terms. These cuts will likely affect equipment procurement designed to modernize German forces by leading to further delays and stretch-outs in major programs, as was the case in 1980. While Bonn justifies these cuts based on the requirements of an austere budgetary situation, the United States, faced with an equally severe and increasing budget deficit, is making significant sacrifices to upgrade its military establishment, and is proposing to increase its defense budget for fiscal year 1983 by 7 percent in real terms over and above inflation.

Although West Germany is largely satisfied with its contribution to the common defense, Prime Minister Apel ruled out the possibility of expanding the NATO Treaty area. NATO's defense umbrella, he stated, cannot be extended to such areas of vital Western, and particularly European, interest as Southwest Asia. Rather, the task of protecting these non-NATO areas must fall to the individual NATO nations involved, or to those nations operating jointly with other Western or non-Western countries. Prime Minister Apel indicated that West Germany "welcomes the worldwide commitment of the United States in the interest and for the sake of the entire West," in spite of the fact that he was unwilling to commit his own nation's forces.

I personally feel that if our West European allies are unwilling to commit directly to the defense of Southwest Asia, then it is incumbent on them to provide indirect support for any deployment of U.S. forces to Southeast Asia or assume greater responsibility for their own forward defense in Europe, thus permitting the United States to reallocate forces now slated for Europe's reinforcement to the defense of the Persian Gulf. Such support could include additional combat service support units for Europe, specific NATO improvements to the Central and Southern regions, or increased use of airlift and sealift to replace U.S. assets that would be used in Southwest Asia. Although West Germany points to its current policy of expanding its naval patrolling area, this is of little help since it involves nothing more than dispersing an already inadequate navy over a larger area. Only by re-equipping German ground force reserves can Germany truly assume a greater responsibility for its own defense in Europe.

Prime Minister Apel's comments regarding the impossibility of extending NATO's area of responsibility notwithstanding, it is necessary for the United States to seek greater communication with, and cooperation and support from, our allies and to impress upon them the importance of sharing the responsibility for defending mutual areas of vital interest. Western Europeans cannot expect the United States to defend their interests in the Persian Gulf, from which Europe gets most of its oil, without at least contributing some of its resources at least in proportion to its interest in the area. As stated recently by a Council on Foreign Relations Commission Report, "It is incongruous that potential Soviet threats within Europe are of formal concern to NATO while an active threat mounted in a non-European region of vital importance to Europe is not."

In spite of how "incongruous" this option might appear to the Council on Foreign Relations, it is obvious from Defense Minister Apel's rather forcefully articulated statement at Wehrkunde that the Europeans do desire to enjoy the benefits of unilateral American protection of Western interests in the Persian Gulf without having it affect the status of U.S. forces in Europe.

> Such activities (i.e., operations of the Rapid Deployment Force) must not jeopardize the balance of forces in Europe. For Europe, the stability of East-West relations is the foundation of its security. The global commitment of the United States and regional stability in Central Europe must be harmonized with each other.

U.S. policymakers must continue to disabuse their Western European counterparts of this desire to have it both ways. The Europeans cannot expect the United States to unilaterally defend vital Western interests in the Persian Gulf and at the same time not draw down on the American forces on the Central Front. West Europeans must do more in areas outside of Europe, such as the Persian Gulf, or be ready to commit more of their own resources to the defense of the Continent.

EGYPT

My talks in Egypt encompassed the better part of one day and began with a briefing by the American Ambassador, Alfred (Roy) Atherton, and members of his staff. The Egyptian officials with whom I met included, in order, Kamal Henry Badir, Chairman, National Security Committee, People's Assembly; Muhammed Hosni Mubarak, President; Kamal Hassam Ali, Foreign Minister; and Lt. Gen. Muhammed Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala, the Egyptian Defense Minister.

Since the signing of the Camp David Accords, Egypt has assumed a far greater role in American foreign policy and, more recently, in American defense policy. As the single most populous state in the Arab World, Egypt has over three times as many people as the next largest Arab confrontation state, Iraq. Moreover, it has more people by itself than do all of the other major confrontation states that surround Israel (Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Libya). Thus, with Egypt, and the Egyptian Army, at peace with Israel, over half of the immeditely available Arab personnel are unavailable for war. More importantly to Egypt, no more wars with Israel means that they will not have to continue to spend vast amounts of money for defense, nor lose large numbers of their people. Consequently, Egypt has a great stake in maintaining peace with Israel, but at the same time it is coming under increased pressure to move back into the camp of its Arab brothers that it left when it signed the Camp David Accords. The importance of Egypt to the United States is that without Egypt, peace in the Middle East is impossible; however, it must be remembered that even with Egypt, the peace process will not move forward without continued American dedication.

This increased importance of Egypt to the United States served as a background for my talks. Other recent events affecting Egypt that played important parts in filling out these discussions included the assassination of former President Sadat, Israeli progress toward withdrawing from the Sinai, Israeli actions toward Lebanon and the Golan Heights, Egyptian concern for the security of the Sudan, Iranian gains in the war with Iraq, and recent statements about RDF facilities.

CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

General agreement still exists among those Egyptian officials with whom I talked that Egypt remains committed to the Camp David Accords. Peace is now a strategic objective. Egypt does not want to fight another war. With seemingly intractable economic troubles, Egypt must turn its attention toward building its domestic rather than its military strength.

The major uncertainty that remains in my mind with regard to Egypt's adherence to the Camp David Accords is how dedicated President Mubarak will be to continuing the pursuit of close relations with

Israel. President Sadat clearly had committed his prestige to pursuing peace with Israel. For many people he embodied the Camp David Accords. President Mubarak, however, does not have the same personal stake in Camp David as did his predecessor. Moreover, the pressures on him to move away from closer relations with Israel and seek some type of reconciliation with the other Arab states will intensify, particularly if Egypt's economic situation worsens.

Thus, I feel that every sign points toward some degree of Egyptian reconciliation with the Arab world. The most likely first step appears to be a reconciliation with Saudi Arabia. This would be particularly attractive to both for their strengths are complementary—Saudi Arabia is the financial and religious center of the Arab world, while Egypt is the historic political and cultural center.

The key question that remains in an Egyptian-Saudi rapprochement is how, and on whose terms, it will take place. President Mubarak is not likely to renounce the peace treaty with Israel—another war would be economically devastating. As negotiations on autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza move forward at their slow pace, however, the pressure on Egypt to halt its participation will grow, particularly after the April 25 Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. In that event, the Camp David process will have run its course without making any progress toward settling the Palestinian issue, and President Mubarak may feel that he can move carefully toward Saudi Arabia. Thus, he will be able to move back toward the Arab world and still retain most of the benefits of peace with Israel and economic and military ties to the United States.

PRESIDENT MUBARAK

In the wake of President Sadat's assassination, President Mubarak has assumed a strong role in administering Egypt. He has made a series of political moves that distanced him from some of the more negative aspects of the Sadat regime, co-opted the secular opposition, and isolated the religious fanatics. President Mubarak dissolved the Cabinet he inherited from President Sadat, named a new Prime Minister and formed a new Cabinet. Although nine of the 32 Cabinet members were not reappointed. He did reappoint the Foreign and Defense Ministers, both of whom are favorably disposed toward the United States.

Although it is too early to say whether President Mubarak will follow many of the same policies as President Sadat, he is already beginning to change the style of the government's relations with its people. President Mubarak gives the impression that he, unlike President Sadat, intends to seek a broad base for his policies and to win over his critics through consultation, rather than through confrontation. Through both political and economic reforms, he is attempting to bring his government to the people. In this regard, his government appears to enjoy broad acceptance, if not always full support, in all sectors of Egyptian society.

THE SUDAN

The attitude among Egyptian officials, from President Mubarak on down, was one of serious concern about the security situation in the

Sudan. President Mubarak himself cautioned that the United States was not doing enough to either be aware of or to aid the Sudan. The strategic importance of the Sudan to Egypt and the United States is clear. The Sudan not only borders Egypt to the south, but it controls the flow of Egypt's lifeblood—the Nile. Moreover, the Sudan has a long coastline along the strategically important Red Sea. A hostile pro-Soviet regime in Khartoum would place great pressure on Egypt, as well as threaten the Red Sea.

The Sudan, I was told, is badly in need of economic aid and equipment for its armed forces. President Nimieri is coming under increasing pressure as a result of (1) the Tripartite Pact among Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen, (2) continued incursions into northern Sudan by Libya; and (3) the influx of over 1,000,000 immigrants from Uganda because of the turmoil in that nation.

President Nimieri accomplished a great deal over the past decade by stabilizing the north-south, Moslem-Christian disputes that threatened to tear his nation apart. Egypt argues that those gains should not be allowed to vanish. The Sudan is too crucial to Egypt, obviously, but also to the United States, to allow it to fall through neglect. Something needs to be done now.

Unfortunately, what that something is, aside from "increased military and economic assistance," was never made clear. I concur with the concern of President Mubarak over the necessity of a secure Sudan, although the exact severity of the threat to that nation is unclear. What is needed, at least, is an increased awareness among senior American policymakers, especially those in Congress, of the importance of the Sudan to Egypt and to the United States. The United States should do whatever is feasible to aid in retaining a secure and friendly government there.

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

For natural geographic, ethnic and political reasons, the Egyptians remain concerned about the Iran-Iraq war, especially if Iran is victorious. Not only is Iran not of the "Arab World," but the religious fanaticism that the Iranians support and encourage has its counterpart in Egyptian society. Fundamentalist Moslem extremists were responsible for the assassination of President Sadat and remain a constant threat to the government of President Mubarak. Moreover, Egypt has a long-standing fear of increased Iranian encroachment into any Arab territory in the Persian Gulf or the Arabian peninsula, not only because of the former importance of the region to Egypt financially, but also because of the continuing adherence of most Arabs to the idea of a United Arab World.

What concerned the Egyptian officials most were signs that Iran was experiencing a military resurgence and was close to regaining lost momentum. They informed me that the Soviet Union sent 400 T-55 tanks to Iran through Libya in February and were concerned that the Soviets planned to send Iran even more equipment and spare parts. Recent news reports of Iranian gains along the Shatt-al-Arab and the land border between Iran and Iraq seem to confirm their fears. President Mubarak and his advisors fear that if Iran should achieve

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a great victory over Iraq, it will leave the Iranians free to focus their attention on other Persian Gulf states.

American expressions of U.S. vital interests in the Persian Gulf always seem to be couched in terms of Soviet encroachment into the region. It is clear from Egyptian concerns, and those of other Arab leaders, that the United States must consider the consequences of complete Iranian victory over Iraq and/or Iranian aggression against the other states in the Persian Gulf region, and be prepared now with a full range of realistic policy alternatives.

UNITED STATES USE OF EGYPTIAN FACILITIES

In a July 29, 1981, letter to President Reagan, President Sadat offered the United States use of the Egyptian military facilities at Ras Banas on Egypt's Red Sea coast. Essentially, this was a continuation of an offer that Sadat had made, and the United States pursued, during the Carter administration. As a result of that offer, discussions are now underway between the United States and Egypt concerning improvements that the United States might want to make at the Ras Banas facility. These improvements are necessary to permit the facility to be more useful as a possible rear staging area should operations involving the Rapid Deployment Force in the Southwest Asia region be required.

Apparently, however, before my arrival in Egypt, an American source had suggested that the United States focus its attention on improving the Egyptian facility at the Cairo West airport rather than the facility at Ras Banas. Unfortunately, as I pointed out to the Egyptians, it appeared to me that Cairo West has a number of drawbacks which argue against it. Unlike Ras Banas, it has no maritime access, it is 500 miles farther from the Persian Gulf, and its proximity to the Capital, and the resulting increase in the visibility of the U.S. presence in Egypt, could become a liability to the development of improved U.S.-Egyptian relations.

The officials with whom I met all seemed to agree with these points. A consensus seemed to exist that it was important that some facilities be improved for United States use during Southwest Asia contingencies, and that Ras Banas was the most logical choice, but everyone also stressed that this facility would always remain an Egyptian base under Egyptian sovereignty. Egypt would grant the United States permission to improve certain parts of the facility to aid in future operations, but no formal agreement could ever be signed granting the United States the complete use of it as a full-fledged base.

ISRAEL

During my visit to Israel, I was joined for the day by Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio). While there were only two meetings during the day, they were both very extensive and covered a wide range of topics. The first was held in the morning with opposition Labor Party leader, Shimon Peres, while the second was held at midday in the Prime Minister's residence with Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon.

Since our visit immediately followed a visit by U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Oman, it was only natural that one of the major topics of discussion by both leaders focused on possible U.S. arms sales to Jordan. In addition, we discussed the status of the suspended U.S.-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding regarding strategic cooperation, the future of the Arab-Israeli peace process, and the limits beyond which Israel would not allow their opponents to go before they would strike out.

ARM TRANSFERS TO JORDAN

Press reports during Secretary Weinberger's trip to the Middle East in February indicated that the Reagan administration was considering providing F–16 aircraft and mobile, improved-Hawk (I-Hawk) antiaircraft missiles to Jordan. These reports were a matter of great concern to Israeli officials from both sides of the political spectrum. Shimon Peres said that the sale of such systems to Jordan would destabilize the area and make "Jordan aggressive and Israel nervous." Prime Minister Begin stated that Israeli bases will be exposed to the I-Hawk missiles, and the F–16s will be able to reach the suburbs of Tel Aviv in minutes. He added. "This (sale of F–16s and mobile I-Hawk missiles) is a matter of life and death for us; for the survival of our children. A greater danger Israel has never faced." On Monday, February 15, 1982, the day before we arrived in Israel, the Israeli Knesset had adopted the following resolution:

The Knesset:

1. Expresses its profound concern at the U.S. Defense Secretary's offer to supply F–16 aircraft and improved ground-to-air I-Hawk missiles, from which the ban on their mobility will be lifted.

2. Declares that the supply of such sophisticated weaponry to the forward state on the eastern front, of the states refusing even to negotiate peace with Israel and maintaining a state of war with her, constitutes a grave threat to Israel's security.

3. Calls on the U.S. Government to refrain—in keeping with the President's declarations and the resolution of Congress—from thus gravely imperiling Israel's security.

The resolution was adopted by a vote of 88–3.

To underline the seriousness with which they view the threat that these new weapons would mean if they were provided to Jordan, Israeli officials provided Senator Glenn and me with a detailed projection of the weapons that they say Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia will have by 1986. According to their information, Iraq will have 4,000 "very good" tanks, 496 first-line planes, 2,660 heavy guns; Jordan will have 1,772 tanks, 170 first-line planes, and 677 heavy guns; Saudi Arabia will possess 480 tanks, 170 first-line aircraft and 718 heavy guns; and Syria will have 4,000 tanks, including T–62 and T–72 tanks, 610 planes and 1,999 heavy guns.

Facing such odds, Prime Minister Begin explained, means that the U.S. pledge to insure Israel's qualitative arms edge has become obsolete. According to the Prime Minister, this flow of weapons into the Middle East is unimaginable and creates a "new quality" of its own that overcomes and surpasses any strictly technical quality that current and future U.S. supplied weapons might have.

Based on my visit to the Middle East, I must conclude that provision of sophisticated arms to Jordan and the apparent redirection of U.S. policy away from Israel and more toward the Arab world is misconceived and ill-advised and will work against long-term U.S. interests in the region. The United States has unwisely followed the lead of the Soviet Union and West European countries by using the sale of arms as a substitute for policy and diplomacy in the Middle East. In each case, the United States justifies these sales on the ground that such confidence-building measures are necessary to bring the moderate Arabs into the peace process.

Unfortunately, I believe that this course is fraught with danger. Such an arms transfer policy has the potential of exacerbating the instability in the Middle East that its was intended to eliminate. If the United States continues to supply increasingly sophisticated weapons to the Arabs, Israel will argue justifiably that it needs more sophisticated weapons systems to counter new Arab capabilities, and a destabilizing arms race will develop. If the regional military balance begins to shift against Israel, or if Israel perceives that it is intolerably vulnerable to the forces of its Arab neighbors, the Israelis may well conduct a preemptive attack to restore their security. Thus, a real danger exists that the very policy that was developed to bring balance, and ultimately peace, could indeed cause another disastrous and unnecessary military conflict solely by the overzealous introduction of sophisticated military hardware into nations whose security problems might more effectively be dealt with by other means.

UNITED STATES-ISRAELI MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING STRATEGIC COOPERATION

Recently, United States-Israeli relations have deteriorated markedly as a result of actions by both the United States and Israel. Not long before my arrival, Israel had attacked Beirut and essentially annexed the Golan Heights. Israel on the other hand was still smarting from a U.S. plan to provide upgraded F–15 fighter aircraft and the E–3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to Saudi Arabia. The latest step in this process of deterioration was taken by the United States on December 18, 1981, when it moved

to put in abeyance the Memorandum of Understanding regarding Strategic Cooperation that was negotiated between Israel and the United States only weeks earlier.

This deterioration is not in the best interests of either country. The United States is Israel's chief ally and principal source of assistance. If Israel questions the support and reliability of the United States, then it may feel compelled to take actions that could adversely affect broader U.S. interests.

Another factor that has tremendous bearing on the need to check any further erosion of United States-Israeli relations is the April 25, 1982, Israeli withdrawal from the remaining one-third of the area of the Sinai Peninsula that was captured from Egypt during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Although a recent poll released by the Jerusalem Post indicated that nearly two-thirds of Israelis polled support the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, there is general concern in Israel about the long-term effects of the withdrawal on Israel's security. Moreover, it seems likely that the Begin government will have to forcibly evict settlers from the Yamit area in the Sinai, further adding to Israeli anxieties. In such an environment at this particular time, Israel needs to be reassured of U.S. reliability, not threatened with isolation from her principal benefactor.

As an equal partner in the peace process, it is in the interest of the United States to reassure the Israelis, not threaten them, as they move cautiously along the path toward achieving all the objectives of the Camp David Accords. Thus, I recommend that serious consideration should be given to bringing back into effect the Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation as soon as possible.

ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS OF THE PEACE PROCESS

Through separate meetings with Prime Minister Begin and opposition Labor Party leader Shimon Peres, two different views of the peace process emerged. Prime Minister Begin, on the one hand, believes that autonomy is the only solution to the problems of the occupied territories. He emphatically rejected the suggestion that a "Gazan entity" for the Palestinians would be a good starting point in these negotiations. In his view, it is impossible to keep the area demilitarized. With regard to the West Bank and Israel's strategy for the development of settlements, Defense Minister Sharon, with Prime Minister Begin's approval, made it clear that the settlements were absolutely necessary from a strategic point of view. They stated that the settlements only covered a small percentage of the West Bank, primarily on the higher ground, and that Israel had to dominate this high ground to prevent it from being used as a staging area for hostile forces in the future.

On the other hand, Mr. Peres indicated that the Labor Party differs with the Begin government's approach to the occupied territories and believes that negotiations with Jordan, based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, to achieve a territorial compromise on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are both possible and necessary. In fact, he argued that Jordan should come to the negotiating table before "de facto" annexation of the West Bank becomes a reality.

ISRAEL'S "RED LINES" OF DEFENSE

During the meeting with Prime Minister Begin and Defense Minister Sharon, they indicated two areas where the Arab states may be contemplating actions that the Israelis consider to be threatening and would cause Israel to strike out in its own defense. They referred to these as "red lines."

The first area, or "red line," involved Saudi jet fighters in Jordanian bases. The Israelis had detected "signs" that Saudi Arabia was considering such a move, but no explanation was provided as to the strategy that would cause this. Both men stated that such a move was totally unacceptable and would provoke them to attack in their own defense. The presence of sophisticated aircraft in such close proximity to the narrow and difficult-to-defend Israeli boundaries was not a matter that was negotiable.

Prime Minister Begin also expressed concern over the increasing friendliness and military cooperation between Jordan and Iraq. Both men felt this to be a preeminent threat to Israel's security, and in this case their "red line" was the movement of Iraqi troops into Jordan. Because they felt that any such move would be a clear indication that Jordan and Iraq were about to attack Israel, it would be enough to provide an immediate response on the part of Israel.

While it is difficult to judge the full extent to which Israel would go if either these or other similar "red lines" were crossed, or the exact definition of what other "red lines" might be, this discussion was important because it emphasized the degree to which the Israeli government remains concerned for its security and the extent to which it will go to insure that security. To say that Israelis are primarily concerned with their own survival is probably to understate the case. This deep concern is real and is something that the United States should not overlook or diminish in its dealings with them. Israel has reacted before to external threats, either real or perceived, with preemptive strikes. I found no reason to believe that the Israelis will react differently in the near future.

BAHRAIN

My stay in Bahrain was brief, but I was able to meet with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa, the Defense Force Chief of Staff, Brigadier Shaikh Khalifa bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa, the Minister for Development and Industries, Yusif Ahmed al-Shirawi, and the Minister for Public Information, Tariq Abd al-Rahman al-Muayyid. On my return from Oman, I was also able to meet with the Commander of the United States Middle East Force, Rear Admiral Charles Gurney, and his staff.

Bahrain has been an important trade center for the Persian Gulf and the Middle East since ancient times. During this century, Bahrain continued as an important stop in the trade of local products throughout the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean areas. Now, since the decline of Beirut and the dramatically increased importance of Saudi oil resources, Bahrain has again assumed major economic importance as an international banking center.

Militarily, the island served as a British outpost during the many years England maintained a dominant presence in the area. Today it is crucial to the United States because the Government permits the continued presence there of the U.S. Middle East Force. Without Bahraini support, the United States would find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to supply those ships, and the American military capability they provide in the Gulf would undoubtedly be removed.

Because of this history of assistance to our forces, United States-Bahraini relations were a principal topic of our discussons. Further, in light of the Arab character of the Bahraini leadership, as well as their desire for closer ties to the United States, this invariably led to discussions of the problems involved in reaching a resolution of the Arab-Israeli crisis, without which those closer ties to the United States could not take place. Also, since Bahrain is just across the Gulf from Iran, is the subject of a lingering territorial claim by Iran, has a large Shiite population, and recently thwarted an Iranian-provoked coup attempt, the progress of the Iran-Iraq war was a major topic at each meeting.

UNITED STATES-BAHRAINI RELATIONS

Bahrain has been the unofficial home of the U.S. Navy's Middle East Force since 1947, and without Bahrain the United States would be unable to maintain a naval presence in the Persian Gulf. It was very encouraging to hear Bahraini officials state that they were quite happy to have had this relationship and wanted it to continue. In fact, in response to my question, a Bahraini official indicated that the United States presence in the region should be as visible as it is in Western Europe and Japan, but that this is politically impossible for the moment. The Bahrainis argue that the current political situation

in their region does not permit a strategic defense relationship between the United States and the Arab states because of the U.S. position of support for Israel. These officials indicated that so long as there is no resolution to the Arab-Israeli dispute, Arab states will find it difficult to seek closer ties with the United States.

This was a theme that I encountered at every stop. Arab officials were extremely concerned about the increasing Soviet threat to the area, but they all expressed reluctance to move closer to the United States. Without a resolution of the Arab-Israeli crisis, they are restrained from closer U.S. ties by threats of internal dissension and regional isolation. When and if the crisis is resolved, they all expect improved relations to be almost automatic. They will then be able to join forces with the United States to more successfully deter the external threat.

Invariably accompanying this explanation of their reluctance to move closer was the apparent belief that only the United States could ultimately resolve the Arab-Israeli crisis, and this was accompanied by a plea for the United States to do more than it is doing and to do it soon. Arab tradition is rife with inter-family and inter-tribal conflict, and the method that tradition provides to ultimately end the feuding is mediation. Moreover, the role of the mediator is very strictly defined as one who is thoroughly respected by both sides of the conflict. Thus, because of U.S. relations with Israel, U.S. relations with many of the Arab nations, and the belief that I heard expressed often that the United States is "the most powerful nation in the world," we are thrust by our position and their tradition into the role of mediator—a role for which no other nation today is qualified. Whether we are comportable with this position or not, it behooves us to understand it and not neglect it, if we truly wish to see a lasting peace in the Middle East.

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

An Iranian-inspired coup attempt in December 1981 reinforced Bahraini concerns about the effects of Khomeinism and the Iran-Iraq war upon their large Shiite population. Calling the coup attempt "not unexpected," Bahraini officials blamed the religious extremists in Iran for undertaking these kinds of external subversive actions. They predicted that Iran will remain chaotic, fragmented, and disruptive, and they expect the war to continue until the internal situation in Iran changes. In addition, they expressed concern over rumors that the Soviets were supplying arms to Iran. While Iraq has not always treated Bahrain well, Iraq is nonetheless Arab, and Bahrain fears a decisive Iranian victory over Iraq greater than it fears Iraq. The Bahrains believe that the United States must consider Iran lost for the foreseeable future as a moderate, stabilizing element in the region.

OMAN

Among all of the Arab nations, outside Egypt, only Oman and the Sudan supported the Camp David Accords. Thus, Oman is politically vital to U.S. interests in Southwest Asia.

Geographically, Oman is equally vital to U.S. and Western interests, for it sits on the Strait of Hormuz, out of which flows the bulk of Persian Gulf oil to the world markets. Militarily, Oman is one of the few states in the region that has granted the United States access to its facilities so that the United States can support its increased naval presence in the Indian Ocean and build toward a set of realistic plans to support the Rapid Deployment Force, should it be necessary to deploy it to the region.

When in Oman, I was able to meet with Yusif Al-Alawi, who was promoted to Minister of State for Foreign Affairs from his post as deputy shortly after my visit; General Timothy Creasey, the chief of the Defense Staff, Sultan's Armed Forces; and Commodore John Gunning, the Commander in Chief of the Sultan's Navy. The topics we covered were, in general, repeated themes from previous meetings on the trip, with some obvious national differences. Because of our commitment to Oman, and theirs to us, the state of our military assistance program, as well as the threat that assistance posed to Oman's relations with its neighbors, was a major topic of the discussions. Other recurrent themes were the threat to the Sudan, the wariness toward extreme outcomes of the Iran-Iraq War, and Omani perceptions of the progress on the Middle East peace process.

UNITED STATES-OMAN DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP

On June 4, 1980, the United States and Oman signed an agreement under which U.S. military forces are to be given access to specified Omani facilities under certain agreed upon conditions. These facilities are being upgraded to fulfill the military purposes of the United States and also to serve permanently the needs of the Sultan of Oman's forces.

The United States is also proceeding with a modest military supply relationship with Oman in an effort to meet Omani defense needs. In fiscal year 1982, the United States made available to Oman $30 million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) financing and $15 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF). In fiscal year 1983, the Reagan administration requested $40 million in FMS financing and $15 million in ESF.

Omani officials stressed the need for more military and development assistance. Although Omani per capita income is relatively high, the country's development began from nearly nothing 10 years ago, and Oman remains a developing country in need of foreign assistance. Omani officials indicated that although their Arab neighbors formerly provided them military assistance, they now expect the United States

to bear most of the cost. These officials did indicate, however, that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates continue to provide some military aid.

SAUDI SUPPORT FOR OMAN

Prior to my visit to Oman, there were press reports that Saudi Arabia offered Oman $1.2 billion if Oman would agree to cancel the facilities access agreement with the United States, and that the Saudis had criticized Oman for its participation in U.S. military exercises. Omani officials indicated that the Saudis continue to be supportive of Omani ties with the United States, and they have not pressured Oman to deemphasize its relationship with America.

THE SUDAN

In a theme echoed from Egypt, the Omani officials expressed their grave concern about the deteriorating situation in the Sudan. The Omanis believe that the Sudan is in desperate economic straits. They blamed this in part on the United States because the Sudan lost much of its Arab support when it endorsed the Camp David Accords. The Omanis believe that Colonel Qadhafi is planning to overthrow the Nimieri regime, which could bring the Red Sea under the control of the Soviets.

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

As in Bahrain, the Omanis are very troubled about the status of the Iran-Iraq War and believe that a complete victory by either side would not serve the long-term interests of other regional states.

Their analysis of Iran's internal politics is that Khomeini's death would produce no real change in the regional situation. They feel that the religious leaders have assumed the dominant role in Iran, and no credible opposition to these clerics exists that is capable of dislodging them.

THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

Omani officials have very strong views on the perceived U.S. failure to restrain hostile actions by Israel and on the future of Camp David. According to Omani views, neither Oman nor Saudi Arabia believes that the United Stataes is fully using its influence with Israel to seek Israeli concessions in the peace process. They argue that Israel continues to annex Arab territory, but the United States does nothing to stop them. Oman believes that no other country can influence Israel, and seems to believe that the United States, by pressure, can affect Israeli behavior. Oman does not object to U.S. support for Israel, but believes that that support is coming at the expense of the United States' Arab friends This was just another clear example of how the Arabs view the United States as the only feasible mediator in the Middle East, whether Americans accept it or not.

Omani officials with whom I spoke were also very pessimistic about the continuation of the Camp David process. They indicated that Egypt will change its policy toward Camp David after the April 25 Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, unless there is progress toward Palestinian autonomy. The Omanis believe that if Israel and Egypt do not reach a satisfactory settlement on autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, no other Arab state will be prepared to talk about peace. U.S. arms sales to Jordan, they said, will not be sufficient to induce the Jordanians to join the negotiations. Accordingly, the feeling is that Camp David is dead unless Israel makes concessions on the West Bank and Gaza.

Again in Oman, as elsewhere in the region, officials were ready to accept our need for facility access to deter threats external to the region, but seemed distressed that we were not doing enough to mediate the resolution of the Arab-Israeli crisis and puzzled that we do not seem to understand the importance or urgency of our role in the process. Only when the Palestinian question is resolved and a lasting peace established would they be free to provide us all the help we need to deter the greater long-term external threats that face the region.

SUMMARY

This trip provided me with insights into our relations with both Western Europe and the Middle East that undoubtedly were best acquired in just this type of visit—one that was extensive in its geographic and cultural breadth, but short in the time it took to complete. Not only did I have the chance to hear the views of both Europeans and Middle Easterners almost simultaneously on many of our common problems, but I was also able to meet with both Israeli and Egyptian officials to discuss their respective sides of the Camp David Accords, and to balance those views against those of other Arabs in the region. My meetings with the Bahrainis allowed me to hear the views of Arabs who represent the Gulf region, and my meetings in Oman gave me the opportunity to hear the views of an Arab state that is more independent in its outlook.

As a result, I am not optimistic about the strength of our relations with the countries of Western Europe, in view of their rush toward continued détente with the East despite recent Soviet moves. Nor can I be encouraged about the future of the Camp David Accords, although I do believe that the Sinai withdrawal will take place at least close to the April 25 deadline. Unfortunately, there are so many remaining strains on Israel and Egypt from both internal and external sources that I have little confidence that after the withdrawal we will see any any progress on the autonomy talks. This is especially true in light of the current American attitude that is putting increased and unnecessary pressures on our historic friendship with Israel and on Israel's already badly deteriorated relations with the Arab world.

If we as a Nation are to provide the necessary mediating force to help bring a lasting peace to the Middle East, then we must abandon our apparent approach of pursuing arms sales as a substitute for diplomacy and a mature foreign policy. This region of the world is so essential to our national interests, and we have so much tied up in both sides, that we must work together to revitalize the process that has brought so many gains to all parties involved. If we do not actively pursue this peace process, we should not be surprised if it collapses. With an active pursuit of it, we cannot be guaranteed success, but we will at least be assured that we are doing our best to relieve the many and varied strains that threaten to harm our national interests and separate us further from our friends and allies.

APPENDIX I

A PREPARED STATEMENT FOR AN ADDRESS BEFORE THE 19TH WEHRKUNDE CONFERENCE BY HANS APEL, MINISTER OF DEFENSE FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, FEBRUARY 13, 1982

ARMS RACE OR ARMS CONTROL

This Military Science Symposium in Munich is overshadowed by the impression of growing tension within the Western Alliance. Are we in agreement on the future orientation of our common policy towards Eastern Europa and towards the Soviet Union? Do we have common answers meeting the formidable economic and social challenges to our countries, both nationally and world-wide? The unbiased listener to the ongoing public debate might get the impression that the North Atlantic Alliance was disordered beyond remedy and that a crisis of the Eastern system manifesting itself in particular in the events in Poland was turning into an almost irreparable crisis in the Western Alliance.

I do not share this critical assessment and estimate of the situation. It is bound to be more difficult for an alliance of sovereign nations to demonstrate constant unity, to confine differences of opinion behind locked doors, to canalize common debates about the proper and collective course of action in such a way that they do not engender any public political side-effects. We should not hesitate to admit that plurality, like national sovereignty, may lead to open—and if unavoidable even controversial—debate within our alliance, that the strength of our Western democracies does not change to weakness if differences of opinion become visible in alliances of nations founded on democratic constitutions. The decisive points are the unity of the alliance, its unity in will and, at the conclusion of the debate, its unity in action.

Let us leave the generalities, the manifold comments, unwise and ambiguous remarks by political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic and turn to the pith of the matter: how does the alliance function? We can then find in a wide spectrum of central issues that the superficial judgements about the alliance drifting apart are altogether wrong.

For a start, let us consider the arms control negotiations between East and West, in particular the negotiations on medium range weapons which have commenced in Geneva. This is an instance where the collective will of the West has been very impressively evidenced. The alliance was in a position to present to the Soviet Union a common and collectively supported negotiating proposal. We strive for what we call the "Zero Solution". We realize that the NATO two-track decision consists of two equal parts and that results in the arms limitation part are achievable only if we also hold on to the TNF moderniza-

tion part and are absolutely determined to make no unilateral advance concessions. In this field, as in other fields, approximate military balance remains an element of common security policy. Of course, the road from here to the conclusion of the Geneva negotiations will be a thorny one. Differences of opinion may emerge, but at the present time there is no reason at all to question the solidity and the solidarity of the alliance in this issue, which is not only of military, but also of political relevance.

Or let us look at our collective effort to maintain NATO's conventional defence capability here in Europe. Budget constraints in this or that year may again and again make it difficult for this or that member country to meet all the commitments entered into within the framework of the alliance. No doubt, the threat emanating from the Soviet Union is growing faster than our military response on the Western side. This is a disconcerting element of NATO's security policy, but it is nonetheless an undeniable fact that the alliance as a whole is increasing its efforts. In the past year, as in all the preceding years, the Federal Republic of Germany managed again to meet the NATO target of a three per cent increase beyond inflation. In the 1982 fiscal year, defence expenditure will grow markedly faster than the overall budget. As defence minister I have my headaches, and I have explained them in detail to the German Bundestag, but nobody can gainsay the Bundeswehr's continued ability to perform its full defence mission also in 1982 in the framework of the alliance.

True, a controversial debate is going on in our country concerning the role of nuclear weapons, including, in particular, the necessity of the possible modernization of such weapons in the event of the Geneva negotiations failing to yield timely results. This debate is bound to raise questions in America. It is also bound to generate concern over the future of the Atlantic Alliance and its embodiment in the political minds of the citizens of Western Europe, especially those of the Federal Republic of Germany. But facts speak an unequivocal language: eighty per cent of our citizens say yes to NATO and so to our close relations with the United States. More than half of our citizens support the NATO two-track decision. The peace movement may well gain additional momentum. It is not, by the way, controlled by Moscow, nor is it a solid political bloc. I would warn our foreign guests here at the Military Science Symposium, however, not to regard the slogans, the demands of the peace movement as demands of the majority of our German population. To me, there is not the slightest doubt that our firm emplacement in the Western Alliance as a prerequisite to our policy of safekeeping the peace and our freedom is much too deeply rooted in the hearts of our people to admit of any reorientation of German foreign and security policy.

We are well aware that the policy of détente has been, and still is, possible only because our republic is firmly tied in with the West. The past decade of détente has been characterized by an increased commitment of our republic to NATO, by an improvement of the operational readiness of our Bundeswehr in terms of both personnel and materiel. It has also been characterized by the rapid and expensive buildup of the European Community. It is no longer possible for any country to master its fate, to secure its right of self-determination, by going

it alone. To us, the Alliance is the basis and fundamental prerequisite for properly conceived and successful Germany policy.

But do we perhaps, after all, see the events in Poland in a different light and therefore run the risk, by analyzing the situation and further developments in Poland differently, of arriving at diverging conclusions in respect of the Western position? Our policy defies any misinterpretation. The Final Act of Helsinki as well as the political and military realities in Europe preclude from the outset two extreme positions: policy towards Eastern Europe can neither be designed to support the power bloc of the Soviet Union and to accept the status quo in Eastern Europe, nor to upset it because either position would result in war.

Our policy, like the policy of the West as a whole, must continue to be oriented towards the elimination of tension, gradual easing of the lot of the people living in Eastern Europe, safeguarding human rights, non-intervention in the domestic affairs of the European peoples—in short, towards the implementation of the Final Act of Helsinki. This is the task our policy is to perform. Excitement, polemics, strong words may be good for one's own frame of mind. Whether they are of any help in the political sphere is a question requiring critical examination.

In our political outlook we are, by no means guided by considerations of national egoism. We are neither drifting away from the Western camp towards neutrality nor do we think narrowly simply in terms of our trade with the East. What we want is to pursue a policy which fosters progress in Europe, which overcomes the status quo, which does not play into the hands of the hawks in Moscow. The decisive point must be the cohesion and the continued viability of the Western Alliance.

Critical developments in East-West relations must not be allowed to lead to disturbances in these relations unless we want to make a gift to the Soviet Union whose goal has always been, and still is, to drive a wedge between the Americans and the Europeans. All the allies must join in preventing the Soviet Union from getting the impression that the threshold of risk is lowered and the Europeans are prepared to have Western Europe turned into a power vacuum.

On the contrary, we must drive home to the Soviet Union that, despite all the differences of opinion in the West, she cannot afford to make the mistake of underestimating the foreign policy of the alliance countries, notably that of the United States of America.

The member countries of NATO have known triumph and tragedy, prosperity and depression, crises, war and peace. Through this experience we have come to appreciate the truth in the words of the Greek historian Thucydides who said: "The secret of happiness is freedom, the secret of freedom is valour."

The statement on Poland issued by the EC foreign ministers on 4 January 1982, the statement by President Reagan and Federal Chancellor Schmidt of 5 January in Washington, and the 16-point statement of the NATO defense ministers of 11 January in Brussels are convincing proof of the common voice and resolute solidarity of the alliance. Joint analyses of the situation and joint conclusions drawn on the basis of frank consultations—these are the reliable foundation for each member country upon which an essentially uniform line can

be taken not only in theory, but also in practice towards the East without any sabre rattling and big words.

II

Over all these considerations, however, we must not forget that it would be an unwise act on the part of the West if it decided to do without détente, for it will only be possible in a political environment characterized by détente for the side-scenes of cold war to be removed, scenes which might prevent the peoples in East and West from seeing the real differences between the Communist and the Western ways of life. An environment susceptible to crises will invariably benefit the more brutal and reckless side. Détente is definitely not tantamount to giving oneself up.

Without the will to promote détente we would also lose sight of the fact that security can be guaranteed only imperfectly through greater and still greater arms efforts, whereas it can be arranged in a much more effective, reasonable and cheaper way by limitation agreements between the parties involved.

The policy of détente is an integral part of a sweeping Western strategy which includes, but is by no means limited to, German interests. Détente serves also the interests of East Europeans, for the discontinuance of détente would kill any marginal prospect of freedom and prosperity. And last, but not least, détente serves the cause of peace throughout the world, for in the absence of the European pillar of détente, other parts of the world would present an even gloomier picture than they do now in any case.

In a speech before the German Bundestag, Federal Chancellor Schmidt referred to three basic philosophies of preventing war.

The first approach seeks to secure superiority for one's own weapons so as to ensure one's own security. This approach results in an arms race.

The second approach aims at unilateral disarmament. There are people who believe that this is the road to be taken for moral reasons. But it is not a way of practical politics. If we followed it we should never manage to promote lasting peace. The only result would be that we had brought about our own impotence and laid ourselves wide open to blackmail by any stronger party that is not guided by rules of morality. An old Russian proverb says:

> Make a sheep of yourself
> and the wolf will not be far away.

The third approach is that of a military balance and of equal security for both sides. Without balance there can be no lasting peace. And I am quite convinced of the wisdom of the remark of an Austro-Hungarian state secretary who, when asked about the essence of the international balance of power, replied:

> None of us career diplomats know what it is. All we know is one thing: it must not be disturbed.

The balance of power is the basis of the strategy of deterrence which has been the subject of heated debate during the last few months. Any security system based on deterrence will naturally raise many questions, including some on moral and ethical issues. This is why we have to make it credible again and again that our strategy is a strategy de-

signed to prevent war, not to make war. What we seek is genuine steps forward in disarmament. The key to success is in Moscow.

During the past two years there were grounds to fear that the dialogue between the world powers might fall victim to a new arms race. For this reason we made even greater endeavours to promote the continuation of the disarmament dialogue. Since the 30th of November last year, representatives from the United States of America and the Soviet Union have been sitting round the green table in Geneva to negotiate on the problematics of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

We welcome the resumed dialogue in particular, since it is apt to allay the fear of war entertained in European countries. We have hopes for the success of the negotiations. We are very grateful for President Reagan's offer to the Soviet Union to spare no effort during the Geneva negotiations to reach the "zero solution".

Successful negotiations in Geneva on medium-range theatre nuclear forces will at the same time pave the way to talks between the two superpowers on strategic nuclear weapons of intercontinental range. Results in the field of medium-range weapons are highly important, but they will be merely fragmentary unless they are supplemented by substantial results achieved in negotiations on intercontinental strategic weapons.

We have learned with satisfaction from the United States government that it intends to continue the SALT process with new proposals to be submitted this spring.

The planned conference on disarmament in Europe may bring about a new qualitative step in the promotion of confidence among nations. Its object is to agree on confidence—building measures applicable to the whole of Europe—from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The Vienna negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and associated measures must be continued with the object of improving military stability in Central Europe and knocking the bottom out of the fear of a possible surprise attack.

III

As political leaders especially responsible for security policy we must not overlook the fact that both the politico-military and the strategic debates on the terms and conditions of safeguarding the peace in Europe are getting more and more incomprehensible to most of our citizens.

For many years, our people accepted this severance of security policy from the general political and generally comprehensible debate. Year after year, they readily paid sums amounting to thousands of millions of marks for national defense, served in the Federal Armed Forces and put up with manoeuvre damage. The ethical and philosophical basic discussions of the fundamentals of our security policy had, however, dwindled to small groups.

This situation changed drastically some time ago. We don't serve any practical purpose if we ponder upon why the basic debate on security policy has suddenly flared up again. By the same token, it is useless to talk of cycles and point out that a profound debate about a

West German military contribution to the preservation of peace and freedom raged already in the fifties and again in the sixties.

The questions involved are nowadays put differently, even more intelligently. While the crucial issue then was whether our integration into the West would facilitate or definitely preclude the reunification of Germany, our young people are now concerned over important questions of a moral or ethical nature. They ask how it can be justified in the face of the hunger prevailing in wide parts of the world that every year more than five hundred thousand million dollars are spent on arms and defence. They ask how anybody can possibly justify his intention to safeguard our society, the self-determination of our peoples, with weapons which, if used, would mean the end of the history of man. With this young generation, we have to discuss and constantly elaborate anew the fact of the basically different tables of values applied in the Communist and the Western spheres. To their minds, acts endangering the peace, such as the suppression of the workers' uprising in the GDR, the erection of the Berlin wall, the invasion of Hungary by Soviet troops and the crushing of the Prague Spring, are past history of no topical relevance.

It follows that our debate will have to go far deeper into the fundamentals of our security policy. We must make the peace-preserving function of nuclear weapons quite clear. We must explain that nuclear weapons are political weapons. We must make people realize that a denuclearized zone in Europe will fail to remove our continent from nuclear danger. Nuclear weapons can also strike upon Europe from bases outside its boundaries. We must emphasize that nuclear armament has preserved the peace in Europe, for in the absence of nuclear weapons and the apocalyptic horrors associated with their use a conventional war in Europe would have been easily conceivable in all the years after 1945. Events that might have set it off have happened again and again.

We have to make our young people realize how rich they are being free and what a privilege it is being citizens of a democratically governed country. In saying this, I deliberately refrain from talking about the steep gradient in prosperity between the East and the West that is so strikingly evident.

All this does not by any means lead to a change in NATO strategy which, I repeat, remains an indispensable element of our security policy. Whoever tampers with the approximate balance of power as the basis for a policy of peace and détente increases the danger of war. Whoever calls into question the ties between North America and Western Europe not only endangers the Western Alliance, but also increases the danger of war.

If wars can be thought of again as being possible without involving the risk of complete destruction for the warring nations, then the threat of the use of force, and even war itself, as an element of policy by different means can come back to haunt us in Europe.

We must make clear that it is not the weapons and the military blocs that threaten the peace, that they are but an expression of the very fundamental antagonism between Eastern and Western societies, and that this antagonism does not disappear simply by having the weapons disappear.

Still, it remains the declared policy of the Alliance—aside from preserving the balance—to take steps toward arms control, to seek détente, to progress from coexistence to cooperation, through arms limitation and arms control to unlock funds that must be used to meet the true challenge of humanity at the end of this century, namely to reduce the peril of war and threat to life deriving from differences in the chances of life and evolution between the industrial and the developing countries. Far too few political leaders are aware that overpopulation, depletion of raw material reserves and an insufficient supply of energy are peace-threatening situations, the elimination of which is an important task for a policy dedicated to securing the peace.

IV

If we continue our policy unperturbed, peace in Europe will remain secure. I do not perceive any development in the foreseeable future that might invalidate this statement.

The approximate balance of forces makes an immediate threat to our security seem unlikely. There is no reason whatsoever in sight that might induce the Soviets to take, under present conditions, any action against the Atlantic Alliance, an action that to them would constitute an incalculable, and thus unacceptable, risk.

The Harmel concept of 1967, which combined defence capability and readiness for détente, strengthened security in Europe and broadened the basis for cooperation between East and West.

While it is true that the East-West conflict continues to dominate the geopolitical scene, the North-South gradient is becoming more and more important. Our security is increasingly threatened by conflicts in the Third World that may have dangerous repercussions on East-West relations and on our raw materials supply situation.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the debate on how the Western countries can best meet this new challenge has increased in intensity. The dual strategy of NATO under the Harmel concept—the concept of defence and détente—provides no answer to the danger that threatens the West outside the NATO treaty area. No new security policy concept that would provide a conclusive answer has so far been worked out.

Stabilizing the region of the Near and Middle East and safeguarding the oil routes is in the interest of the West as a whole.

It is necessary, therefore, that the Allies deliberate among themselves how each of them can, within his possibilities, best contribute to protecting these interests. These efforts should be coordinated in accordance with jointly developed policy objectives.

The Alliance needs a political concept to guide it with respect to the management of "external" crises and threats. What is crucially important in this context is that we make the right of all states to self-determination the maxim of our actions. If they prefer to be nonaligned, we must accept and respect their decision. They are not a glacis of our foreign policy. They are equals having the right to determine their own course. Development aid and diplomacy are the decisive means of political action available to us in the Third World.

Avoiding and controlling conflicts in the Third World, and averting dangers that threaten to disrupt the flow of raw materials to the West-

ern industrial nations is thus largely a political problem, at least not only a military one.

A joint political concept must therefore combine political, economic and military aspects. They must be commensurate with the overall extent of the threat and the possibilities of the Allies within the scope of their sovereign responsibilities.

As far as the military component of a concept for global crisis management is concerned, we should bear in mind that expanding the NATO area is out of the question. Therefore, it can in any case only be a matter of individual NATO nations, perhaps jointly with other Western countries, assuming additional tasks outside the NATO territory proper, in the interest of all. From this, then, follows the principle of division of labour in the Alliance.

We welcome the world-wide commitment of the United States in the interest and for the sake of the entire West. One element of this commitment is the Rapid Deployment Force.

One aspect to be considered in the discussion of the political and materiel implications of the Rapid Deployment Force as conceived by the United States is the fact that the entire set of measures designed to implement the U.S. global strategy is closely meshed with the plans which the Alliance has adopted to assure its deterrence and defense capability within the NATO area. One need only think of the possible use of supply depots in Western Europe in support of missions of the Rapid Deployment Force.

Such activities must not jeopardize the balance of forces in Europe. For Europe, the stability of East-West relations is the foundation of its security. The global commitment of the United States and regional stability in Central Europe must be harmonized with each other.

V

The arena where Germany makes it main contribution is Europe. Here the Federal Republic provides its share in accordance with the priorities agreed upon in the Alliance: we have, for example, made considerable progress in implementing the German-U.S. programme to support external reinforcements from overseas. We have fulfilled a major part of the Long-Term Defence Programme. We have lifted the operational boundaries for the German Navy in the North Sea. And we have for years been providing financial aid to the tune of thousands of millions of marks in an effort to stabilize NATO's southern flank.

Since security policy is not confined to defence policy, the public funds spent on development aid, for instance, must aiso be mentioned in this context. In the past three years our expenditures for this purpose added up to between 6,100 and 6,500 million DM per year. Together with France we occupy the second place behind the United States.

An uninformed observer following the debate of the past 18 months might come to the conclusion that the defence contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany is in a bad way. Such a judgment concerning the Federal German Armed Forces would be totally wrong.

I will explain why:

With invariable regularity NATO reflects on the changes in the East-West balance of forces and expresses its concern that the balance has shifted even further in favour of the East. In all these discussions

one thing becomes clear: less concern over the balance of forces would be necessary if in the past all the NATO nations had met their commitments the same way we did.

For instance, to us restructuring the Federal Armed Forces was a means to increase the number of soldiers and substantially modernize the Federal Armed Forces. Over the past ten years the number of personnel has risen by approximately 30,000. During the same time we had a massive increase in funds spent to equip the Federal Armed Forces with a new generation of weapons. After deployment of the Leopard II, the number of our tanks will have increased from 3,000 to 5,000.

All this is so irrespective of the fact that the huge procurement projects will, because of their cumulation, give us some headaches during the next few years. We have a number of lean years ahead of us. Difficult fiscal years will come, in which we will have to manage with a tight budget.

But we will also in the future attempt to achieve real increases in that we intend to fully compensate for price increases. Still, with rising prices, decreasing revenues and thus lower rates of increase in the defence budget we will have to accept that henceforth we will be able to initiate any major effort in some areas only if we can save correspondingly large sums in others.

We must not forget that in the Federal Armed Forces we do not have before us a destitute, materially impoverished Army, but that we are starting out from a very high standard.

On the basis of annual increases of the defence budget by some 2.8 per cent in real terms during the past decade we were able, during the 70s, to achieve for the Federal Armed Forces through long-term consistent planning: modern equipment, a high state of training, firm acceptance by the public, a high state of defence readiness and social circumstances for which they are envied by others.

Let me mention a few key facts which signify the high level we have achieved:

Army structure 4 is, as far as the Army field forces are concerned, in the final stage of implementation. Even for 1982, the armed forces were given new personnel slots when in all other public-service sectors slots had to be deleted. In the case of many major weapon systems the change of generations is in full swing. Withal, a consistently high state of training and thus a high degree of combat effectiveness are being maintained. Incidentally: Thousands of millions of marks to preserve the viability of Berlin (1970–1980=90,000 million DM), for economic and military aid and in the form of net payments into the budget of the European Community (6,000 million DM in 1981) complete the balance sheet of Germany's contributions made in the Western interest.

Great efforts are required to maintain the present high standard of our armed forces. I am firmly convinced that these efforts will be successful.

We must even now chart the course for the next decade. This means that in our armed forces plans we must formulate a realistic strategy.

The main problem in the more distant future—though not one of the next 5 years—will be to maintain the Federal Armed Forces at a manpower level necessary for the contribution of the Federal Republic

of Germany to the collective defense of Central Europe. What must be avoided at all costs is reducing the combat units of the armed forces to cadre strength. What will work to our advantage is that the compulsory military service system makes available to the Army in peacetime and war a large reservoir of manpower. This eases considerably the problem of securing extended-service volunteers as well as career soldiers, a problem that we share with most of our partners. Something that should not be overlooked is that within three days we can mobilize some 700,000 fully trained reservists.

VI

From our efforts for national defence it is apparent that our ties with the West and our membership in NATO are unquestioned. They are indisputable. The Atlantic Alliance has been, and will continue to be, the guarantor of our security. Only in this strong alliance are we able to preserve the peace and at the same time guarantee the independence and freedom we need to maintain our most important values: respect for the dignity of man, belief in democracy, and trust in the rule of law.

In all this our ties with the United States, which by reason of our historical experience have come to be regarded as being a matter of course, are the immovable cornerstone of our foreign and security policy. There is no chance that the Soviet Union might be able to drive a wedge between us, between Europe and America; the less so since our close economic and cultural ties are a reflection of a shared system of values. Without the protection of a superpower, the United States, Europe would be at the mercy of another superpower, the Soviet Union. Our policy of détente would have been deprived of its foundation. We are not travellers between two worlds.

Our politics will continue to be consistent, reliable and predictable. We belong fairly and squarely in the Western Alliance, and we shall continue to make the contribution to its future that is expected of us.

APPENDIX II

A Prepared Statement for an Address Before the 19th Wehrkunde Conference by Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense for the United States of America, February 13, 1982

I am especially pleased to address this distinguished gathering. The annual Wehrkunde encounter has a very special place among annual gatherings as a conference where serious deliberations are carried on against the background of frivolity for which fasching is justly famous.

The great NATO Alliance of which we are very privileged to be a part and to be a participant, has guarded the peace of Europe for more than three decades. The young generation that today seems to question its validity, its purpose and its strategy, has been born and raised in the shelter and security which NATO has so admirably provided. The prosperity of free and sovereign nations of the North Atlantic Alliance—a prosperity that has dimmed only momentarily by a temporary economic downturn—has been nurtured and secured by the collective strength that we all have brought to our common effort to maintain a stable balance between East and West.

Ours is a defensive alliance, perhaps in many ways you might say the most remarkable such alliance in recorded human history. It's a collection of states bound by a shared belief in the freedom and the dignity of the individual which has come together on the principle an attack against one is an attack against all. These nine words express the ultimate commitment of 15 nations to a system of collective security of unprecedented depth and accomplishment.

We are allies; we're also friends. And among friends it is best to speak plainly, with the confidence that our differences are most successfully resolved when they are most fully discussed.

In this place, I don't think it is necessary to dwell at length on the magnitude of the burdens that the unrelenting growth of Soviet military power has forced on us all. More than six decades after a resolution that promised "bread and freedom," the Soviet Union enjoys neither. Its exertions have yielded weapons in place of bread and totalitarian rule in place of freedom. The economy of the Warsaw Pact, as a desperate plight of Poland partly shows, has subordinated the search for a more abundant life to the accumulation of military power. Year after year the tanks and guns and ships and planes have come off the production lines, menacing free people everywhere and helping to plunge the weak economies of the COMECON countries into huge debts.

Not so many years ago it was quite fashionable to argue that the expansion of trade between East and West, and especially between the industrial nations of Europe and the Soviet Union, would bring about an interdependecy that would, in turn, lead to a moderation of

Soviet behavior, that was the hope. One heard of "fat and satisfied communists" who were to be preferred to Communists who were lean and hungry. There was talk of enmeshing the Soviets in a web of interrelationships that would bind them to the norms of behavior that we felt. But sound practices of business and banking were left behind as an army of Western businessmen made their way to Moscow and Warsaw and Prague with government guaranteed credits, subsidized loans—and a vague sense that peace would follow along with profits.

This economic expression of the theory of détente has turned out to be expensively and I think it's fair to say dangerously wrong. "Business as usual" with the Soviets, and expansion of East-West trade simply meant, on the Soviet side, more money for the Soviets to spend on their military. And that is what they did with their trading profits. Trade, with a country that ignores the already wretched quality of life for its own citizens, and then turns its trading gains into a one-nation arms race, encourages aggression rather than helping to bring peace. The massive infusion of Western capital and know-how of the last decade did not produce moderation or restraint. Instead, it helped to sustain the continuing build-up of Soviet arms as money and technology was turned to the principal purpose to which the Soviet economy is attuned: the production of more and better weapons.

Today there are trucks built at the Kama River Plant, with Western help, deployed with Soviet troops in Afghanistan, a small unhappy nation now occupied by the force of Soviet arms. Today a generation of sophisticated micro-electronics, built in the Soviet Union with Western know-how and Western production equipment, helps to make the Soviet weapons more accurate, more reliable and of course more lethal. Today there is a major Soviet naval combatant under construction in a floating drydock built by a U.S. ally: tomorrow it will threaten the sea lines of communication that join Europe and America and our friends in the Far East.

The profligate transfer of industrial know-how and advanced technology from West to East has added significantly to the defense burdens under which all our allies labor. Every taxpayer in every country of the Alliance will this year sacrifice to enable us to offset Soviet military forces that have benefited from technology and equipment that we have sold—often on terms far more favorable than we extend to our own industry and our own citizens.

The more we learn about the extensive military use the Soviets have made of Western technology, the more alarmed we have become. And the closer we look the more we learn. We have tried to explain our concerns: within the Alliance in Brussels, where there is a study of technology transfer now underway; in Paris, where COCOM has been meeting; at Ottawa, where President Reagan proposed that we join together to step the hemorrhaging of technology transfers in recent years; and in testimony before our Congress and in speeches such as this.

We do this because we recognize that we cannot solve the problem alone, no matter how deep our concern. But I believe we do have an obligation to share that concern with the Alliance as a whole, and to ask that we agree on a common approach. In the end, if we are successful in strengthening the controls applied to the transfer of technology and industrial know-how to the Warsaw Pact then we will

lighten the defense burden that we all continue to share. For I am convinced that the cost to the West of our helping the Soviets to increase their military strength exceeds many times over the benefits that accrue to private firms when, as at present, the flow of technology and know-how is only loosely controlled.

It is an unfortunate fact that one of the few efficiencies of the Soviet centralized economy—an economy that is hopelessly inefficient in virtually all its aspects—is the opportunity that it provides them for trade designed primarily to increase Soviet power and influence.

The collapse of the Polish economy and its awesome 28 billion dollar indebtedness to the West requires some urgent rethinking about economic relationships between East and West. We should build on what we have learned. We have learned or should have learned quite a lot. We've learned that the possession of unsecured paper is a source of leverage on the lender, not the borrower. We have learned that the easy assumption that the Soviets would never allow a Warsaw Pact member to go into receivership, practically speaking, is wrong. And we've learned that the disincentives to productive labor that are inherent in the COMECON economic systems will sooner or later triumph over their national plans and imperil economic growth and stability.

So it seems clear to us that a return to the discipline of the market place in East-West trade will dictate greatly reduced levels of trade and investment. And before again supplanting that discipline with vague theories that associate increased trade with decreased hostility, and profits with peace, it seems to me we need to come to terms with all the Alliance security implications of an increasingly sophisticated Soviet defense industrial technology base financed by the West.

Even if there were a fundamental reorganization and reorientation of East-West trade and technology transfer policies that would reduce substantially the military benefits the Soviets have come to expect from the West, much will have to be done to overcome the strategic imbalance that has developed in recent years. To accomplish this, as I'm sure you know, the Reagan administration has embarked on a $180 billion strategic program that will modernize our strategic deterrent and maintain it well into the 21st Century.

Under this comprehensive program, we will:

—Improve significantly the command, control and communications system on which all our forces depend so vitally;

—Enhance the penetrability and survivability of our bomber force by proceeding now with the B–1 bomber and also accelerating R&D on an advanced technology follow-on bomber that offers very great promise;

—Build and deploy the MX ICBM, which is bigger and heavier —and has more warheads, on a survivable secure base;

—Improve the sea-based leg of our strategic triad by initiating development of the far more accurate Trident II missile;

—Rebuild our badly neglected and deteriorating strategic defensive forces; and finally,

—To our worldwide secure reserve force, add the deployment of the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile.

I shall be clear about our purpose. It is the Soviet drive to acquire a crippling and disarming first strike counterforce capability, and to

achieve overall military superiority, that has made our stratgeic modernization program imperative. Our purpose is only to restore a margin of safety to the strategic balance—a balance that has deteriorated in the face of chronic neglect. We seek sufficient strength to deter Soviet aggression and only that.

Our program will give us the forces that have long been recognized as necessary to implement our policy of deterrence. We seek security, not superiority. We seek stability and not adventure. We have based our program on identified and immediate requirements. As a percentage of the Defense Budget, we are spending less on strategic forces now than we did in the 1960s. Had our strategic forces not been neglected in the 1970s, we would not now be faced with the need for such a comprehensive program in the 1980s. It is my hope that a steady hand at the helm in the next decade will prevent the emergence of an even greater challenge in the 1990s.

We are also moving to strengthen the theater nuclear posture of the Alliance by implementing the December 1979 decision to deploy intermediate range nuclear forces, ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles. And we are moving on a broad front to increase our conventional capabilities with substantial additions this year in our budget just submitted to readiness and sustainability.

All of these programs add up to a significant increase in the U.S. defense budget and a corresponding burden on the American people. It is a burden that we gladly assume if it is fairly shared. One way we believe that we can preserve the newly formed national consensus for increased defensive efforts is to assure the American people that we are rearming America as economically and effectively as possible. We have made many improvements in our procurement and budgeting procedures. We have gone after savings large and small and I'm convinced we have a budget that accurately states our needs this year as part of our 6-year program that the President has proposed to rearming America and thus to deter aggression. We also have tried to increase our strength through the Alliance, both inside and outside NATO, by a network of friendships, and military and economic assistance to our friends. But it's not all military aid.

The Soviets frequently talk about how much they help other countries—Poland is an example of this "help." The United States, by contrast, has indeed helped many countries in many ways. Just take one continent, for example, Africa. There the Soviets have given 1/48th of as much as we have. All of theirs is military aid. Little of ours is for military.

We have tried to lead by example—the example of devoting a vast amount of our very considerable resources to the safety of America and our Allies, and to the cause of freedom. But the American people, I fear, will begin to question, through their representatives in Congress. I hope that none of us will do anything that will fan that to NATO or our other Allies, if they feel that our Allies are not carrying fair share. Isolationism, in one form or another, is never very far from the surface in many parts of America and in the Congress. I hope that none of us will do anything that will fan that latent isolationism into reductions of our own defense effort at home. The American people may not wish to bear the burden of necessary defense expenditures if they think some are doing less as we do more.

With an image of "business as usual" between Europe and the Warsaw Pact, add that to the lack of resonance that our own efforts have elicited, and we will have a recipe I am afraid for great danger. Above all, the NATO Alliance must be preserved and strengthened.

Some ill-informed columnists and commentators, who out of really great ignorance, contend that there are any weakening or is any weakening of any kind in our attachment to NATO, do a great disservice to the cause of freedom.

Unrequired American involvement in the effort to strengthen the Alliance may lead to a sense of isolation, and the "ism" will follow as night follows day, would be very quickly added and that would be a great tragedy and that is what worries so many of us at home and that worry comes only from a desire to preserve and strengthen NATO.

In association with everything that we are trying to do there is a willingness expressed repeatedly by the President, to seek arms reductions, genuine arms reductions, that will diminsh the threat we face. In the search for agreements that are fair, balanced and verifiable, the President has proposed that world arsenals be diminished first by the elimination of all intermediate range nuclear armed missiles. We have offered to scrap NATO's plan to deploy ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles if the Soviets will dismantle theirs of comparable range and agree to limits on shorter-range missiles that could substitute for them. If the Soviets will not, then we must persevere with the NATO plan, for it is that plan which helped to bring us to Geneva.

The President's offer is an historic one. And I hope and pray that it will become an historic agreement. And to the Soviet claim that our zero proposal is mere propaganda, I would say only this: that our negotiators at Geneva have tabled a draft treaty that will be signed by the United States as soon as the Soviets agree and the details can be negotiated.

We will succeed in this endeavor, as in the others I have discussed, only if we continue to act in concert—only if the solidarity we have succeeded in gathering within the NATO Alliance withstands the forces that imperil it. We should bear in mind that for perhaps ever since its creation, certainly for the last 25 years, it has been a prime element of Soviet policy to try to undermine and destroy the NATO Alliance. We should never allow that to happen. I hope and I trust that we will, in Winston Churchill's memorable phrase, have the will to stay the course.

APPENDIX III

AN ADDRESS BEFORE THE WEHRKUNDE CONFERENCE BY WILLIAM S. COHEN, UNITED STATES SENATOR AND CHAIRMAN OF THE SEA POWER AND FORCE PROJECTION SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, FEBRUARY 13, 1982

First, let me commend Dr. Apel for a very comprehensive statement and also commend Senator Tower for his moderate response. He is fast evolving into a statesman, which is bound to undermine his political support back in Texas.

In his statement Dr. Apel suggested that the Soviet Union cannot afford to make the mistake of underestimating the foreign policy of the alliance countries, notably that of the United States of America.

Let me suggest that the United States can have no foreign policy unless it's shared and supported by its allies. And with that as a precondition, let me futher conclude that we therefore have no foreign policy. On the one hand, the Europeans look at the United States and accuse us of exercising a global unilateralism. On the other, we in the United States look to Europe, and we hear the tapping of Chamberlain's umbrella on the cobblestones.

Dr. Apel had occasion to quote from Thucydides that the secret of happiness is freedom and the secret of freedom is valor.

I have had occasion to quote those very words, but I might add that courage involves a certain capacity for self-discipline. I recall that Walter Lippmann once addressed the graduating class at Harvard and he said, "Upon the standard to which the wise and honest will now repair it is written: You took the good things for granted. Now you must earn them again. For every right that you cherish, you have a duty you must fulfill. For every hope you entertain, you have a task you must perform. For every good that you wish to preserve, you will have to sacrifice your comfort and your ease. There is nothing for nothing any longer."

Let's see how we have disciplined ourselves and sacrificed our comfort and our ease.

Two years ago, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Our self-discipline and sacrifice involved the cancellation of our participation at the Olympics. At that time, we spoke of burden-sharing. And last year, Chancellor Schmidt in speaking of burden sharing and a three percent commitment to a real increase in defense spending said that the three percent was arbitrary, mechanistic and irrelevant to our (West Germany's) real defense capability.

This year, Poland is being gang-raped by military leaders who parade to the world that they are boy scouts who are just trying to help their motherland across the street to rejoin the sisterhood of socialism. And our response to date has been the lighting of candles in the Oval Office and the shipment of grain and technology to the Soviet Union.

Santayna once said that those who are ignorant of history are doomed to repeat it. Those who are indifferent to history are also doomed to repeat it. And we have become indifferent to the significance of Berlin, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. All have become forgotten in our daily lives.

The voices that called out for freedom, voices that were crushed under tanks, are not even echoes in our ears. That question of freedom for East Europe, we are told, was settled at Yalta.

And further, we are told by our European friends, the U.S. is in no position to condemn marshal law in Poland as long as it sends military and economic aid to El Salvador.

Senator Tower spoke about the gas pipeline which Western Europeans are now contemplating building for the Soviet Union. We in the United States are opposed to the construction of the gas pipeline. It is our position to let the Soviet Union spend 10 percent of their GNP for commercial and industrial purposes rather than 15 percent of their GNP for purposes of making war and aggression. It is our opinion that Europe will become the victim of economic and energy blackmail.

But we cannot ask the Europeans to pay the price of a denial of profits unless we are willing to do the same. And the answer, of course, is that we are not. We, as you, love profits more than we hate communism and totalitarianism. A nation that is willing to feed the Soviet Union has no business lecturing nations who wish to draw fuel from it, even though it is my personal belief that if we stop shipping grain, you will still be buying gas.

We feed Soviet soldiers, we pay Polish debts. In the face of treaty violations, of yellow rain in Cambodia and Laos, of Soviet weapons in Yemen, Libya, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Poland, we cancel Aeroflot flights into the United States, light candles, and threaten future sanctions.

Ladies and gentlemen, we have run out of alibis. The United States looks to Europe and concludes that we cannot lead because you will not follow.

Europe looks to the United States and says you will lecture but will not lead. Besides, you would lead us in the wrong direction.

What we have developed is a capacity to rationalize away our paralysis and impotence as a collective power.

Each time we call for action, we trip over our premise and sprawl all over our conclusions.

—We cannot claim default on the Polish loan because that would merely relieve the Soviet Union of a huge burden;

—We cannot cancel the Caterpillar contract for that would simply increase unemployment in America. Besides, the British, the Germans, the Japanese—and surely the French—would start a stampede for the business;

—We cannot cancel the Helsinki Accords for that would remove any ability of the West to urge moderation upon the Soviets and deprive us of a forum to denounce their atrocities to the world. I pass over the example of free speech as practiced in Madrid last month;

—No, of course, our scientists will not tolerate any infringement upon their freedom to exchange their intelligence and research with Soviet scientists who report only to truth and the KGB.

We have demonstrated an infinite capacity to rationalize away the absence of any strategy to deal with threats every bit as dangerous and every bit as probable as an assault across the Central Front.

Senator Tower is correct in stating that we have preserved peace in Western Europe. But, ladies and gentlemen, we have sacrificed our honor in the process.

What the West must develop is a doctrine as direct, unequivocal, and inflexible as the Brezhnev Doctrine which, simply stated, is "what is yours may be ours but what is ours will never be yours."

That, of course, will be regarded as too simplistic, too undiplomatic and too dangerous. It will destroy détente, revive the Cold War and lead to a hot one.

It is just as possible that it might lead us out of this quicksand of indecision and pathetic immobility.

Dr. Apel has suggested that the youth of West Germany are concerned about moral and ethical questions. My answer to Dr. Apel is let the German youth go to Cambodia and to Laos and let them inhale the yellow gas that settles over those nations like fog over London. And then let them go to Poland and stand in the bread lines and come back and talk to us about moral and ethical questions.

Dr. Apel has suggested he welcomes the worldwide commitment of the United States for the sake of the entire West. Well, what is the policy of the United States? Is it to defend the prosperity of Europe and Japan by defending the Persian Gulf? And if so, do you expect us to do it alone? You are engaging in a gross self-deception.

And yet you say expanding NATO beyond its geographical area is out of the question. And the Rapid Deployment Force must not jeopardize the balance of forces in Europe. Let me suggest to you there is no conceivable way to have a Rapid Deployment Force unless we do, in fact, imbalance our forces in Europe.

Secretary Weinberger will ask for two new aircraft carriers. He will not get them unless the Europeans help pay the cost by increasing their manpower or help share the cost of the ship construction itself by handing us a check.

Dr. Apel said that the Third World countries have the right of self-determination. My answer is that Afghanistan is now enjoying self-determination. Dr. Apel says that it is a political problem, not a military one. My response is that it is a military one and not a political one.

We need to re-examine the nature and the threat to our security and freedom and we have to expand it beyond the thrust across the central front and consider that Europe has a jugular vein that's naked and pulsating and vulnerable in the Persian Gulf and that each nation must be prepared to share in the burden of paying to defend that interest.

While I recognize that in our debates we do not want to contribute to the fracturing of the alliance, let me also suggest that we do a greater disservice if we try to paper over the fundamental differences in our views of the danger that confronts us.

Ladies and gentlemen, we cannot continue to stuff our ears with the cotton wool of rhetoric. Each of us must sacrifice our comfort and our ease because there is nothing for nothing any longer.

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